Practice and Procedure by unknown
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 47 
Issue 1 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
LAW 
Article 9 
Fall 1995 
Practice and Procedure 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1995) "Practice and Procedure," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 47 : Iss. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
I. COURT LIBERALLY APPLIES RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE TO CASE OF MISNAMED DEFENDANT
In Hughes v. Water World Water Slide, Inc.' the South Carolina Supreme
Court considered the problem of a misnamed defendant in a civil action,
holding that the amendment to an original summons and complaint correcting
the name of a corporate defendant related back to the filing of the original
complaint under Rule 15(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
In so holding, the court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court
ruling in Schiavone v. Fortune which applied Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to a similar set of facts, even though the federal rules at the
time of Shiavone consisted of the same text as the current South Carolina
rule.3 Although the amendment to the pleadings and service on the correctly-
named defendant occurred after the running of the statute of limitations, the
court found that the defendant had received notice of the action "within the
period prescribed by law" as required by Rule 15(c). 4
The Hughes court also upheld a previous ruling that the provisions of
Rule 3(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all
defendants.' Rule 3(b) permits a plaintiff to meet the service requirement for
commencing a civil action by delivering the filed summons and complaint to
the sheriff of the county in which the defendant or a designated agent of a
defendant corporation usually or last resided.6 The court disregarded the title
to Rule 3(b) which read "Commencement When Defendant Absent." The title
has since been amended to read "Tolling of the Statute of Limitations."'
The plaintiff, a police officer, was injured when he fell in a hole on the
premises of the defendant corporation while pursuing a burglar on August 12,
1988.8 On August 12, 1991, the last day of the statute of limitations period,
the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint which named the defendant as
Water World Water Slide, Inc. The plaintiffs attorney delivered a copy of the
summons and complaint to the sheriff's office of Horry County for service
upon the defendant, a resident corporation whose correct name is Wet World,
1. _ S.C. _, 442 S.E.2d 584 (1994).
2. 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
3. Hughes, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 586.
4. Id. at , 442 S.E.2d at 586.
5. Id. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 586 (citing Garner v. Houck, _ S.C. _, 435 S.E.2d 847
(1993)).
6. S.C. R. Civ. P. 3(b).
7. S.C. R. Civ. P. 3 notes to 1994 amendments.
8. Hughes, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 585.
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Inc. On August 15, 1991, the summons and complaint were served upon the
corporation's president, who had been on the premises the night of the
plaintiff's accident. 9
In determining the corporation's name for the purpose of filing his
complaint, the plaintiff relied on the name appearing on the sign in front of the
defendant's building and on the reference to the defendant by its insurance
company as Waterworld Waterslide.'0 The defendant moved for dismissal on
the grounds that the summons and complaint did not properly contain the
names of the parties." The plaintiff filed an amended summons and com-
plaint on October 28, 1991, naming Wet World, Inc. as the defendant. 2
In holding that the application of Rule 3(b) is not limited to absent
defendants, the court adhered to its recent decision on this issue in Garner v.
Houck. 3 In Garner the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint in a wrongful
death and survival action and delivered a copy to the sheriff for service within
the statute of limitations period. The sheriff served the summons and complaint
on the defendant doctors and hospital three days later, after the statute had
run.14 Because of the heading of Rule 3(b), which read "Commencement
When Defendant Absent," the lower court dismissed the complaint, finding
that, in order for the delivery of the pleadings to the sheriff to effect service
and toll the statute of limitations, the plaintiff was required to show that the
defendants were absent from the county at the time of delivery.15 The
supreme court reversed the lower court's decision and overruled any
conflicting dicta on this issue in Able v. Schweiizer'6 and Dandy v. American
Laundry Machinery, Inc.17 In these cases, the court had held that delivering
service to a private server rather than the sheriff did not fall within the ambit
of Rule 3(b).
The court in Garner based its decision on the rule of statutory construc-
tion that although the heading of a section is part of the statute, it may not be
construed to limit or undo the plain meaning of the text and is of interpretive
use only to resolve ambiguities in the statutory language. 18 The court noted
9. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 585.
10. Id. at_, 442 S.E.2d at 585. Although the Hughes opinion states that the insurerreferred
to its insured as "Wet World Waterslide," the record indicates that the insurer's reference was
actually to "Waterworld Waterslide." Record at 17.
11. See Record at 10-11.
12. Hughes, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 585.
13. __ S.C. _, 435 S.E.2d 847 (1993).
14. Id. at , 435 S.E.2d at 848.
15. Id. at _, 435 S.E.2d at 849.
16. 300 S.C. 322, 321, 387 S.E.2d 697, 697 (Ct. App. 1989).
17. 301 S.C. 24, 26, 389 S.E.2d 866, 867-68 (1990).
18. Gamer, _ S.C. at _, 435 S.E.2d at 849 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)).
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that the text of Rule 3(b) does not limit its application to absent defendants and
instead explicitly includes corporate defendants that "cannot be absent. " 9
The court concluded that not only does the text of Rule 3(b) lack ambiguity,
but applying the language of the heading to limit the rule would create
ambiguities in its construction. For instance, the courts would be left to
determine whether the defendant must be absent from his dwelling, the county,
or the state, and precisely when this absence would trigger the rule.2" The
court noted further that the statute which Rule 3(b) was intended to replace,
South Carolina Code of Laws section 15-3-10,2 was not limited to absent
defendants.?
The court in Hughes, following its decision in Garner, held that when the
plaintiff delivered the pleadings to the sheriff in the county where the
defendant resided, the statute of limitations was tolled, without regard to the
defendant's presence or absence.'
The Hughes court reasonably refused to limit the tolling provision of
Rule 3(b) to absent defendants because of the purpose of the rule and policy
considerations underlying the rule. Under Rule 3(a) of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, the commencement of an action requires both the
filing and service of the summons and complaint. The federal rules require
only filing a complaint to commence the action in federal question cases,24
allowing a 120 day period for service of the pleading.' Many state rules also
allow filing alone to commence the action or allow either filing or service of
the pleadings to be sufficient for commencement.'
South Carolina's requirement of service to toll the statute of limitations
could create a hardship on the plaintiff if the plaintiff is not also given some
ability to control service of the pleadings. The purpose of Rule 3(b) is to
ensure the plaintiff an avenue of effective service.27 By allowing the plaintiff
19. Id. at__, 435 S.E.2d at 849-50.
20. Id. at , 435 S.E.2d at 850.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1985).
22. Garner, _ S.C. at __, 435 S.E.2d at 850. The court cited for comparison § 15-3-30
of the South Carolina Code of Laws, which addresses the effect of an absent defendant on both
the accrual of an action and the tolling of the statute of limitations under certain circumstances.
23. Hughes, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 585.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 3. In diversity cases, the federal courts must follow the state rule.
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
26. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-i, Rule 3(a) (1990).
27. See Jensen v. Doe, 292 S.C. 592, 594, 358 S.E.2d 148, 149 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that section 15-3-10, which was replaced by Rule3(b), was not intended to provide for substituted
service or acquiring personal jurisdiction, but only to create an additional method of tolling the
statute of limitations), cert. denied, 295 S.C. 69, 367 S.E.2d 162 (1988). This protection was of
greater concern when § 15-3-10 was enacted in 1870 than it is today because obtaining personal
service was more difficult at that time. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
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to deliver service to the sheriff of the county where the defendant usually or
last resided, the rule prevents the defendant from defeating the plaintiff's cause
of action by evading service. When Rule 3(b) replaced South Carolina Code
section 15-3-10, the requirement that actual service be accomplished within a
reasonable time after delivery to the sheriff was added to protect the
defendant's interest in timely notice of the claim.28 These competing interests
of the parties are valid regardless of whether the defendant is present or
absent. Although a proof of absence requirement would incur the difficulties
in interpreting "absent" mentioned by the court,29 the court could have
construed Rule 3(b) to require a good faith attempt to serve the defendant
before delivery of service to the sheriff. However, the court's decision
recognizes the purpose of Rule 3(b) and furthers the policy that courts prefer
a decision on the merits rather than on procedural technicalities.
The court followed precedent in construing Rule 3(b) without giving
undue weight to its title. Although the former heading of the section seemed
to indicate that the legislature intended to limit the application of Rule 3(b) to
absent defendants, there is no further evidence of this intent in the body of the
rule or in the notes. Indeed, in the 1994 amendment the misleading heading
of Rule 3(b) was changed to "Tolling of the Statute of Limitations" to reflect
the court's decision in Garner v. Houck. 0
The Hughes court next considered whether the amended summons and
complaint related back to the date of the original pleading, which had
effectively commenced the action within the statute of limitations period.
Rule 15(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff
to amend a complaint after the deadline for the statute of limitations. South
Carolina Rule 15(c) uses the language of the pre-1991 Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It allows relation back when the "claim or
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the [same] conduct,
transaction or occurrence" as that in the original pleading. Where the
amendment changes the name of the party against whom the claim is asserted,
the amended claim relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and if:
within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him
the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of
the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his
service was more difficult at that time. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(tolling the statute of limitations when defendant is out of state).
28. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 3 notes. An unresolved issue that may arise in the future is what
period should be considered a reasonable time.
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
30. S.C. R. Civ. P. 3 notes to 1994 amendments; see also S.C. CONST. art. III, § 17 ("Every
Act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be
expressed in the title.").
1995]
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defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against him."
Prior to the 1991 amendments, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted Federal Rule 15(c) in Schiavone v. Fortune.32 In Schiavone the
plaintiff filed a complaint within the state statute of limitations period, naming
Fortune as the defendant. Fortune was the name of a magazine and a division
of Time, Inc., but was not a separate legal entity and lacked capacity to be
sued. The plaintiff amended the complaint after the running of the statute but
within the 120 day period allowed for service by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.33 The United State Supreme Court affirned the dismissal
of the action, holding that Federal Rule 15(c) required the plaintiff to meet the
notice criteria within the "prescribed limitations period." 4 The Court
specifically and narrowly interpreted "the period provided by law for
commencing the action" to mean the state statute of limitations period."
While approving the four-pronged analysis set forth in Schiavone to
analyze the requirements of Rule 15(c), the Hughes court declined to follow
the Supreme Court's interpretation of "within the period provided by law for
commencing the action." The South Carolina court found that the rule in
Schiavone is inconsistent with Rule 8(f) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure,36 which requires that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to
do substantial justice to all parties."3 The court noted that Congress amended
Federal Rule 15(c) to include Rule 4's additional time period for service of
pleading in the time period allowed for defendant to receive notice of the
claim. The court cited the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1991 federal
rules amendment, which states that Rule 15(c) was revised after Schiavone v.
Fortune because the result was "inconsistent with the liberal pleading practices
secured by Rule 8."38 Federal Rule 8 is substantively the same as South
Carolina Rule 8(f). 9 Although South Carolina Rule 15(c) had not been
amended to correspond with the federal rule, the court read the South Carolina
rule to be consistent with the Advisory Committee's Note to the amended
federal rule.
31. S.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (emphasis added).
32. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 25 (1986).
33. Id. at 27-28.
34. Id. at 29.
35. Id. at 30-31.
36. Hughes, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 586.
37. S.C. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note to 1991 amendment; see Hughes, _ S.C.
at _, 442 S.E.2d at 586.
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
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In South Carolina, Rule 3(b) provides for a reasonable time period for
actual service of the pleadings upon the defendant after the delivery of the
summons and complaint to the sheriff of the county in which the defendant
resides.' Therefore, the court in Hughes held that the defendant received
actual notice of the claim within the period allowed by law when the pleadings
were served upon the president of the defendant corporation during the
reasonable time period for service.41 Moreover, both parties agreed that by
the service of the summons and complaint with the incorrect corporate name,
the defendant received notice such that it would "'not be prejudiced in
maintaining its defense'" and that the defendant "'must or should have known
that, but for a mistake concerning [its] identity, the action would have been
brought against it'" as required by Rule 15(c).42
The court further noted that the president of the corporation was present
at the time of the injury from which the claim arose and that the incorrect
name on the summons and complaint was a trade name used by the defen-
dant.43 Because the court determined that the "period allowed by law"
included the reasonable time for service, it held that the plaintiff's amended
claim to correct the defendant's name related back to the date the original
pleading was filed and delivered to the sheriff, within the statute of limitations
period. The court found that the plaintiff met the requirements of Rules 3(b)
and 15(c) as interpreted in its opinion, and reversed the lower court's dismissal
of the action.'
Despite the fact that South Carolina had not adopted the revised Federal
Rule 15(c), the court in Hughes applied the rationale behind the provisions of
the rewritten federal rule. The court declined to follow the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the "plain language" of the text of
Rule 15(c) in Schiavone v. Fortune."5 Prior to Schiavone, federal courts were
divided on whether "the period provided by law for commencing the action"
included a reasonable time for service.46 In 1985 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reached the same conclusion as the Schiavone Court, holding that
notice was required strictly within the statute of limitations period.47
In addition to relying on the revised federal rule, the Hughes court
emphasized the equities of the case and the policy embodied in Rule 8(f) of the
40. S.C. R. Civ. P. 3(b).
41. Hughes, _ S.C. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 586.
42. Id. at __,442 S.E.2d at 586.
43. Id. at __,442 S.E.2d at 586..
44. Id. at __,442 S.E.2d at 586.
45. 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986) ("The choice.., is between recognizing or ignoring what the
Rule provides in plain language. We accept the Rule as meaning what it says.").
46. See 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at
107-13 (2d ed. 1990).
47. Weisgal v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir. 1985).
1995]
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South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, citing Russell v. City of Colum-
bia.48 In Russell the court stated that "pleadings in a case should be construed
liberally so that substantial justice is done between the parties" 49 and further,
that "a judgment on the pleadings is considered to be a drastic procedure by
our courts." 50 However, the Court in Schiavone specifically considered the
text of Federal Rule 8(f): "'All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice. "51 Additionally, the Court viewed its previous rulings as
consistently upholding the premise that "the spirit and inclination of the rules
favored decisions on the merits ... "52 Despite these considerations, the
Court resolved not to "temper the plain meaning of the language by engrafting
upon it an extension of the limitations period equal to the asserted reasonable
time. . for the service of a timely filed complaint. "3
Although Hughes can be distinguished from Schiavone because the
plaintiff in Hughes made a good faith effort to determine the correct name of
the corporation, in both cases the correct defendant had actual notice of the
claim within the reasonable time allowed for service after the statute of
limitations period. 4 The Court in Schiavone stated that notice within the
limitations period was the linchpin to Rule 15(c) and that the seeming
arbitrariness associated with the limitations period was imposed by the
legislature rather than the courts.5 5 The dissent in Schiavone pointed out that
the purpose of Rule 15(c) is to enable the plaintiff to correct an error in the
complaint after the statute of limitations has run when the defendant will not
be prejudiced. 6 The notice requirements were added to the rule in 1966 to
prevent prejudice to the defendant, but the majority's narrow construction of
these requirements served to penalize the plaintiff for a harmless pleading
error, a mere technicality.57
The holding in Schiavone v. Fortune was widely criticized prior to the
1991 amendment to Federal Rule 15 because it encouraged decisions on the
48. 305 S.C. 86, 406 S.E.2d 338 (1991).
49. Id. at 89, 406 S.E.2d at 339 (citing Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 84, 245 S.E.2d 120,
123 (1978)).
50. Id. (citing United States Casualty Co. v. Hiers, 233 S.C. 333, 339, 104 S.E.2d 561, 564
(1958)).
51. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 27.
52. Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)); see also Fonan v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (refusing to apply a technicality to deny petitioner's motion for appeal).
53. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 30.
54. Hughes, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 585-86; Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 30, 33.
55. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 31. But see Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate
Illustration of the Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 720, 728 n.41 (1988).
56. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 39.
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pleadings rather than the merits of a case' and because it created an
anomalous result.59 Under the old Federal Rule 15, a defendant properly
named in a timely filed pleading might receive notice of the action up to 120
days after the statute of limitations had run because Federal Rule 4 allows the
plaintiff this time period for service. However, if a plaintiff misidentified the
defendant or made an error in the name of the defendant in the timely filed
complaint, the amended complaint would not relate back to the date of the
original pleading unless the defendant was also served within the limitations
period. Thus, for example, a defendant served five days after the deadline for
the statute of limitations would prevail if the complaint contained a misnomer,
but a correctly named defendant could have no notice of the action for four
months without being prejudiced. Accordingly, the result in Hughes can be
viewed as a response to the inequity of the result in Schiavone, as can
Congress' 1991 amendment to Federal Rule 15(c).1
The dissent in Schiavone also asserted that Rule 15(c) was designed to
protect against a misidentification of the defendant, which required bringing
in a new party, rather than to protect against a misnomer.6 The notice
requirement in Rule 15(c) applies when the amendment changes the party
against whom the claim is asserted.' In Schiavone, the amendment arguably
effected a change of parties from a division of the corporation, Fortune, to the
corporation, Time, Inc., although the two had a common interest. On the other
hand, the mistake in the original pleading in Hughes falls into the misnomer
category. "A misnomer is involved when the correct party was served so that
the party before the court is the one plaintiff intended to sue, but the name or
description of the party in the complaint is deficient in some respect."63
The court in Hughes did not explicitly make the distinction between
misnomer and misidentification. In two recent South Carolina cases, however,
the court held that a misnomer was correctable by amendment after a judgment
had been entered.' In Griffin v. Capital Cash the court held that when a
defendant corporation is designated in the pleading by its trade name and
properly served, even failure to amend the complaint to correct the corporate
name "does not invalidate the process or the judgment where the misnomer
causes the corporation no prejudice."6 The rationale for this distinction is
58. See 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, at 114.
59. See G.F. Co. v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 1498, 1501 (9th Cir. 1994).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note to 1991 amendment.
61. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 35-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, at 126.
63. 6A id. at 130.
64. See Tri-County Ice and Fuel Co. v. Palmetto Ice Co., 303 S.C. 237, 399 S.E.2d 779
(1991); Griffin v. Capital Cash, _ S.C. _, 423 S.E.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1992).
65. Griffin, _ S.C. at , 423 S.E.2d at 146 (citing United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber
Co., 162 F.2d 872, 873 (4th Cir. 1947) ("If it names them in such terms that every intelligent
19951
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that when a defendant has been properly served but simply misnamed in the
pleadings, the party against whom the claim is brought has received notice as
if there were no mistake and, thus, is not prejudiced. Other jurisdictions have
held that an amendment to correct a misnomer is not subject to the notice
requirement of Rule 15(c) and, therefore, is unaffected by the result in
Schiavone.6
Because the amendment in Hughes was to correct a mistake in the
properly served defendant's corporate name rather than to change or add
defendants, the court could have based its decision on the mistake-misnomer
distinction. However, a careful reading of the rationale employed by the court
indicates that in cases of either misidentification or misnomer, it will construe
Rule 15(c) liberally to the extent that the rule does not work to prejudice the
defendant. Similarly, in its amendment to Federal Rule 15(c), the Supreme
Court attempted to make the rule work equitably for both the plaintiff and the
defendant by providing that "[i]f the notice requirement is met within the
[service] period, a complaint may be amended at any time to correct a formal
defect such as a misnomer or misidentification." 67
The court in Hughes upheld its previous ruling that an action is com-
menced, and the statute of limitations is tolled, by delivery of service to the
sheriff without regard to the defendant's absence. This interpretation of
Rule 3(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides the plaintiff
a sure means of effective service while protecting the defendant's interest in
timely notice of the claim.
South Carolina Rule 15(c) allows an amendment to pleadings that changes
the name of a party against whom the claim is brought to relate back to the
date of the original claim if the defendant has sufficient notice of the action
"within the period provided by law for commencing the action. "68 Following
the rationale behind the 1991 amendment to Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Hughes court held that this period includes the
reasonable time for service after the pleadings have been delivered to the
sheriff. The court's interpretation of Rule 15(c) allows the plaintiff to correct
a mistake in the complaint without prejudice to the defendant, providing the
same notice period for properly named and misnamed defendants.
Frances T. Barnes
person understands who is meant ... it has fulfilled its purpose; and courts should not put
themselves in the position of failing to recognize what is apparent to everyone else.")).
66. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Stillwell, 604 A.2d 886 (D.C. 1992); Wathen v. Greencastle Skate
Place, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note to 1991 amendment.
68. S.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
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II. COURTS EXAMINE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
In two recent decisions, the South Carolina Supreme Court and the South
Carolina Court of- Appeals re-examined the use of peremptory challenges in
jury selection' under the rule established by the United States Supreme Court
in Batson v. Kentucky. 2
In Sumpter v. State3 the South Carolina Supreme Court made two
noteworthy rulings. First, the court found that the explanation given by a
solicitor for striking a black juror-that he had struck the juror earlier in the
week in a different case-was a "race neutral" reason for striking him again.4
Second, the court held that a black appellant had failed to show that the
prosecutor's explanation for striking a second black juror-because of the
latter's prior "involvement" with a DUI charge-was pretextual, 5 even though
a white juror was seated who had a prior DUI conviction.6
In Foster v. Spartanburg Hospital Syster 7 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals examined a number of reasons offered by the defendant to explain
why it used all of its peremptory challenges to remove four of the five
potential black jurors from the panel. In addition to finding a number of the
reasons pretextual, the court held that "a sweeping generalization about
1. The classic definition ofa peremptory challengewas givenby Blackstone: "an arbitrary and
capricious [s]pecies of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without [s]hewing any cau[s]e at
all." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346. He offered two reasons for the existence
of this type of challenge. First, recognizing both "what [s]udden impre[ss]ions and unaccountable
prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and ge[s]tures of another," and the
necessity that a prisoner have a good opinion of his jury, the common law refused to let him "be
tried by any one man again[sit whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to
a[ss]ign a rea[s]on for [sluch his di[s]like." Id. at *347. Second, it was viewed as a way of
protecting the defendant from the possible harm that could result from a failed challenge for
cause, because the "bare que[s]tioning of [a juror's] indifference may [s]ometimes provoke a
re[s]entment." Id.
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. _ S.C. _, 439 S.E.2d 842 (1994).
4. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 844.
5. In State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E.2d 891 (1989), the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that, even though a reason for striking a black juror had been "sufficiently neutral
to withstand the Batson inquiry," it was "proven to be a pretext because it was not applied in a
neutral manner." Id. at 281, 379 S.E.2d at 892; see also State v. Robinson, 305 S.C 469, 473,
409 S.E.2d 404, 407 (1991) (observing that "the burden is on the defendant to prove that the
Solicitor's neutral reasons for his strikes were pretextual because they were not applied in a
neutral manner"), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 937 (1992); Chavous v. Brown, 299 S.C. 398, 385
S.E.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding discrimination where defendant in civil case struck black
female jurors because they were young but seated white females who were even younger), rev'd,
302 S.C. 308, 396 S.E.2d 98 (1990), vacated, 501 U.S. 1202, aff'dper curiam on remand, 305
S.C. 387, 409 S.E.2d 356 (1991).
6. Sumpter, __ S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 844.
7. _ S.C. 442 S.E.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1994).
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members of an entire political party [is] not ... [a] reasonable, race neutral
explanation" and thus does not satisfy an inquiry under Batson.'
In Batson v. Kentucky9 the United States Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"0 prohibits peremptory
challenges of prospective jurors based solely on account of their race." The
Court set forth a three-step procedure, derived from its cases dealing with
charges of intentional discrimination under Title VII, for courts to use in
deciding whether a peremptory strike is unconstitutional." A defendant must
first establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by showing that
he "is a member of a cognizable racial group . . . and that the prosecutor has
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race." The defendant may rely on the fact that "peremptory
challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discrimi-
nate who are of a mind to discriminate'" in order to meet his burden of
showing that the circumstances "raise an inference" of intentional racial
discrimination."' Once the prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor to provide a "neutral explanation" for the strikes. While rebuttal
need not "rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause," neither
can it rest on a mere assumption or intuition that the excused jurors would be
biased in favor of a defendant of their own race; nor is it sufficient simply to
deny an illicit motive or make an affirmation of good faith. 4 Instead, a
prosecutor "must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case
to be tried."" Finally, the court must decide whether "the defendant has
established purposeful discrimination."16
Sumpter v. State17 involved a black defendant found guilty on two counts
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. In selecting the jury,
8. Id. at__, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. The Equal Protection clause states:"... nor [shall any State] deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
12. See id. at 94-96 nn.18-19.
13. Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 97.
15. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
16. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The holding in Batson was limited to the exercise of race-based
strikes of prospectiveblack jurors by a prosecutor in a criminal action against a black defendant.
However, the Court has gradually extended the rule to cover other situations. See Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (criminal defendants); Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991) (both parties in civil trials); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (the
striking of black jurors when the defendant is white). Recently, the Batson rationale was further
extended to prohibit the use of peremptory strikes based on gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel
T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
17. _ S.C. _, 439 S.E.2d 842 (1994).
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the prosecutor used two peremptory strikes, each time removing a black male
from the panel.18 In response to defense counsel's Batson motion, the
solicitor explained that one juror was struck for two reasons: because he was
young, and because the solicitor had struck him earlier in the week.19 The
second juror, according to the solicitor, was struck because he had "a prior
DUI involvement," and the prosecutor who had handled the earlier case "felt
as though he might not be a fair and reasonable juror. "0
In considering the validity of these explanations, the court noted that the
burden is on the party making the Batson motion to prove that the allegedly
neutral reason for striking a juror is pretextual because it has not been applied
in a neutral manner.2" As to the first juror, the court did not discuss the
defendant's argument that an explanation for a strike that rests on a previous
unexplained strike merely begs the question.' Rather, the court summarily
found this explanation to be racially neutral. Furthermore, because the record
did not disclose precisely how old the struck juror was, the court refused to
consider the argument that the explanation based on age was pretextual.3
Defendant Sumpter next argued that the different treatment of the black
juror with a DUI "involvement," whom the State struck, and the white juror
with an actual DUI conviction, whom the State did not strike, revealed that the
solicitor's explanation was nothing more than a pretext for excluding the juror
because he was black.' The court, however, focused on the fact that, while
the struck juror's DUI "involvement" had been with the solicitor's office that
was prosecuting Sumpter, nothing in the record indicated that the seated, white
juror had been prosecuted by that same solicitor's office.' The court's
rationale for drawing such a distinction rested, in part, on the United States
Supreme Court's statement in Hernandez v. New York?6 that "[u]nless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason
offered will be deemed race neutral."'27 In addition, "great deference" should
18. Id. at , 439 S.E.2d at 843.
19. Id. at __,439 S.E.2d at 843.
20. Id. at _,439 S.E.2d at 844. In State v. Oglesby the South Carolina Supreme Court
approved as a racially neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge the solicitor's
explanation that the juror had a DUI conviction. 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E.2d 891 (1989). In
Sumpter it is unclear from the record whether the solicitor used the term "involvement" as a
euphemism for "charge," or "conviction," or for something else altogether.
21. Sumpter, ___S.C. at , _ , 439 S.E.2d at 843, 844 (citing State v. Johnson, 302 S.C.
243, 395 S.E.2d 167 (1990)).
22. See Brief of Appellant at 7.
23. Sumpter, _ S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 843-44.
24. Brief of Appellant at 8.
25. Sumpter, _ S.C. at_, 439 S.E.2d at 844 ("No evidence was presented that the white
juror who was seated had the same disqualificationas [the stricken juror], i.e. a DUI involvement
which was handled by this particular solicitor's office.").
26. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
27. Id. at 360; State v. Green, 306 S.C. 94, 409 S.E.2d 785 (1991) (citing Hernandez, 500
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be accorded to the trial court's "findings regarding purposeful discrimination"
because they depend largely on an "evaluation of demeanor and credibili-
ty. "
28
Justice Toal, joined by Justice Finney, dissented, arguing that a defendant
need not "show anything more than the seating of a white juror when the same
reason was used to excuse a black juror." 29 In her view, the solicitor's
reliance on the recommendation of his colleague, who thought the juror with
prior DUI involvement would not be "fair and reasonable," was "meaning-
less" because nothing was offered to "distinguish the excused black juror with
DUI involvement from the seated white juror with a DUI conviction.""
By justifying its decision on the basis of an incomplete record, the court
imposed upon Sumpter's defense counsel the responsibility of responding to
the solicitor's justifications for the strike and ensuring that the record
specifically reflects why the trial court should have rejected the proffered
explanations. Because the record contained an insufficient rebuttal to the
prosecutor's explanations, the trial court's finding of no Batson violation was
affirmed.
31
Foster v. Spartanburg Hospital Syster22 involved a wrongful death
action by Virginia Foster, a black woman. During jury selection, the defense
used all of its allotted peremptory strikes to remove four of the five blacks
from the panel.33 Pursuant to plaintiff's motion, the trial court called on
defense counsel to provide race-neutral reasons for each of the strikes, after
which the court found that there had been no purposeful discrimination.34 The
jury later returned a verdict for the defendant, and Foster appealed.
In its unanimous opinion, the appeals court focused primarily on the
reasons given by the hospital for striking two of the four excused jurors. 35
U.S. 360), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 962 (1992).
28. Sumpter, __S.C. at, 439 S.E.2d at 844 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352 and Green,
306 S.C. at 98, 409 S.E.2d at 787).
29. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 845 ('oal, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 845.
31. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 844.
32. _ S.C. __, 442 S.E.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1994).
33. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
34. Record at 28.
35. The court did not consider the validity of defense counsel's explanation for the striking
of two other black males. As to the first, defendant's counsel claimed to have stricken a black
male because he was a single male, 20 years of age, and might be likely to identify with the
decedent's son, whom counsel described as "a really clean-cut young guy who is working his way
through school as a student at the University of South Carolina," and who would testify for the
plaintiff. Id. at 29-30. Counsel also explained that he removed a black male who reported
suffering from a back injury for which he filed a Workers' Compensation claim. In addition,
according to the defendant's business records, the juror had an unpaid bill at the defendant
hospital. Id. at 28-29.
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The defendant offered three reasons for removing one thirty-five year old man.
First, in response to a question on the juror questionnaire about membership
in various types of organizations, he answered that, among other organiza-
tions, he was a "member of the Democratic Party."36 Second, responding to
another question, he wrote that he was "a loyal American citizen, [who has]
never been in any trouble with the law."37 Lastly, he reported a family
history of heart trouble, allergies, and high blood pressure.38
The defense claimed to have removed a thirty year old black woman for
two reasons. First, she was the only young female juror whose mother
suffered from high blood pressure, a condition which also plagued the
plaintiffs decedent.39 Second, according to the defense, she was the only
juror who failed to answer the question on the juror questionnaire asking, "Do
you feel that you could fairly decide a lawsuit involving a hospital and an
individual? " ' °
Unlike the supreme court's approach in Sumpter v. State, which showed
great deference to the determination of the trial court,4" the court of appeals
directly considered the validity of the proffered explanations. The court found
that the defendant's explanations were not "reasonable" and therefore rejected
both. While Batson requires that the reasons for striking a juror be race-
neutral,42 the South Carolina Supreme Court has added to Batson, requiring
that an explanation must also be "(2) related to the case to be tried, (3) clear
and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate. "I The court later held that "[a]ny
such explanation must rest on a reasonable basis and not on the solicitor's bare
assertion or mere speculation."'
Addressing the struck male juror's declaration of party loyalty, the court
rebuffed the respondent's suggestion that a "Democrat is more inclined than
a Republican or some other party affiliate to favor 'the little person.' Such a
36. Foster, __ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
37. Id. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
38. Id. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
39. Id. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
40. Id. at , 442 S.E.2d at 626; see also Record at 223.
41. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
42. In Hernandez v. New York the Supreme Court defined a race-neutral explanation as "an
explanation based on something other than the race of the juror." 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991).
43. State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 298, 384 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1989).
44. State v. Grandy, 306 S.C. 224, 227, 411 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1991). Interestingly, the
United States Supreme Court has never held that peremptory strikes may not rest on sweeping
generalizations, but only that such generalizationmay not reflect racial or gender stereotypes. See
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). Furthermore the Supreme Court has specifically stated that the explanation "need not rise
to the leveljustifying excercise of a challenge for cause." Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; accord Tomlin,
299 S.C. at 298, 384 S.E.2d at 709.
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sweeping generalization about members of an entire political party is not a
reasonable, race neutral explanation, but is mere speculation." 45
Although the court of appeals was still in the second phase of the Batson
analysis, examining the neutrality of the proffered explanations, the court
seemingly looked ahead to the third phase of the analysis and found the
explanations to be pretextual. One way a movant may show that a proffered,
race-neutral explanation is pretextual is to demonstrate that it has not been
applied even-handedly. 46 Applying this standard to the defendant's explana-
tion for striking the black male juror, the court stated that it could see no real
distinction between the excluded juror's declaration of loyalty as an American
citizen and a response to the same question by a seated white juror who said
she was "a law abiding citizen."" The court held that the hospital had
"negated" this second reason for disqualification because it was not applied
even-handedly.
The court was similarly skeptical of the defendant's explanation that it
struck both jurors because of their family medical histories. The court
observed that a number of seated, white jurors either themselves suffered, or
had family members who suffered, from ailments like those reported by the
excluded male juror.48 As to the female juror, the court refused to accept as
significant that she was the only young woman whose mother had high blood
pressure. Counsel argued that this fact raised concerns about her being
disposed to sympathize with the female plaintiff, whose mother had also
suffered from high blood pressure. 49 To the court, this precise confluence of
similarities was insufficient to distinguish the excluded female from those
white jurors-at least one of whom was a female-whose family members also
suffered from a heart condition or high blood pressure.D
Finally, addressing the defense's argument that the female venireperson
was struck because she failed to answer a question on the juror questionnaire,
the court noted that at least two white jurors were seated who also had failed
to complete the questionnaire fully. The court pointed out that, in any event,
all the jurors were orally questioned by the trial judge as to whether they
"knew any reason they could not give a fair trial to both parties," and the
45. Foster, - S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 626 (citing State v. Grandy, 306 S.C. 224, 227,
411 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1991)). In Grandy the court rejected a prosecutor's explanation that he-
struck a black juror simply because he wanted to seat other venire persons not yet presented, and
said that "[a]ny such explanation must rest on a reasonable basis and not on the solicitor's bare
assertion or mere speculation." Grandy, 306 S.C. at 227, 411 S.E.2d at 208.
46. State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 281, 379 S.E.2d 891, 892 (1989).
47. Foster, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
48. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
49. See id. at _,442 S.E.2d at 626.
50. See id. at 442 S.E.2d at 626.
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struck female did not affirmatively respond.51 The court reversed and
remanded for a new trial."
Both the supreme court and the court of appeals followed the Baston
methodology. In Foster the court of appeals focused on whether (1) political
party affiliation and (2) family medical history are "reasonable, race-neutral"
justifications for striking members of the jury venire. In Sumpter, having
found the proffered explanations to be "reasonable and race-neutral," the
supreme court focused primarily on the third prong of Batson: whether the
movant met its burden in showing that the proffered explanations were merely
pretextual.
The holdings of these cases offer three signals to practitioners involved
in Batson disputes. First, Foster suggests that explanations for striking jurors
must be both race-neutral and reasonable in order to shift the burden back to
the movant to show pretext. Second, the court of appeals has indicated a
willingness to look ahead to the even-handedness of the application of the
explanations to determine whether they are valid. Finally, Sumpter makes clear
that movants must ensure that the trial record is complete and clearly reflects
all the circumstances that give rise to an inference of racial discrimination.
C. Shawn Dryer
III. COURT REJECTS LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF RULE 59(b)
In Boone v. Goodwin' the South Carolina Supreme Court overruled the
court of appeals' interpretation of Rule 59(b) of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 59(b) states that in jury cases "[t]he motion for a new
trial shall be made promptly after the jury is discharged, or in the discretion
of the court not later than 10 days thereafter." 2 The supreme court interpret-
ed the rule as requiring a party to "make a motion for a new trial promptly
after the jury is discharged or request ten days within which to make the
motion. "'
The jury in Boone returned a verdict for Goodwin, the appellant. After
the jury was discharged, the respondent clearly indicated that he had no post-
trial motions.4 The respondent filed a motion for a new trial or judgment non
51. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 626.
52. Foster, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 627.
1. _ S.C. _, 444 S.E.2d 524 (1994).
2. S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(b).
3. Boone, _ S.C. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 525 (emphasis added).
4. After polling and excusing the jury, the court engaged in the following colloquy with
respondent's counsel:
The Court: All right... anything?
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obstante veredicto (JNOV) two days later.' The trial court granted the
respondent's motion for a new trial.'
During post-trial arguments, the appellant contended that the respondent's
motion for a new trial was untimely. Despite its awareness of persuasive
authority supporting the appellant's position,7 the court found it had discretion
to grant the motion. In so holding, the trial judge determined that the
presence of the disjunctive "or" in Rule 59(b) showed the drafters' intent to
give the court the authority to grant the motion for a new trial within ten
days.8
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
order granting a new trial.9 The court held that the respondent's motion for
a new trial was untimely because it was not made promptly after the jury was
discharged.' 0 The court stated that if one is not ready to make a motion
promptly after the jury is discharged, one must request ten days within which
to make the motion." Under this interpretation, a court may only use its
discretion to determine, at the close of the trial, if a ten day extension for post-
trial motions is warranted.
The supreme court based its decision on two principal sources. First, the
court recognized Lightsey and Flanagan's interpretation of Rule 59(b).' 2
Lightsey and Flanagan state that "[c]ounsel must move for a new trial
promptly after the return of the verdict, or request ten days within which to
make the motion."" Second, the court relied on the Reporter's Note to Rule
Counsel: Nothing further, your honor.
The Court: No motions?
Counsel: No motions.
Record at 14.
5.Id. at4.
6. Id. at 1.
7. The trial judge recognized that the appellant's position was supported by "a very large body
of opinion," including that of Harry M. Lightsey, Jr., former Dean of the University of South
Carolina School of Law and co-author of the South Carolina Bar publication on South Carolina
Civil Procedure. Referring to Lightsey, the judge stated, "that's some pretty strong weight."
Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 19.
9. Boone, _ S.C. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 525.
10. Id. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 525.
11. Id. at _, 444 S.E.2d at 525. The Court noted that Rules 59(b) and 50(e), which
concerns motions for JNOV, have the same language and a substantially similar accompanying
reporter's note. Id. at _ nn.1-2, 444 S.E.2d at 525 nn.1-2.
12. Id. at_, 444 S.E.2d at 525 (citing HARRY M. LIGHTSEY, JR. & JAMES F. FLANAGAN,
SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 389 (2d. ed. 1976)).
13. LIGHTSEY & FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 389 (1985) (comparing
counsel's motion for a new trial with a trial court granting of a new trial on its own motion).
Under Rule 59(d), the court, on its own initiative, may order a new trial for any reason for which
it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party. This order must be made no later than
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59, which states: "In jury trials, post-trial motions are made promptly at the
end of the trial, or at that time the court, upon motion, may grant an
additional ten days to make them."14 Relying on these two sources, the court
quickly concluded that the respondent's motion was not timely.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals previously advanced a contrary
interpretation of the rule. In Buxton v. Thompson Dental Company5 the
court of appeals, like the trial judge in Boone, interpreted Rule 59(b) to give
a court discretion to allow a motion for a new trial anytime during the ten day
period following entry of judgment.16 The court of appeals reasoned that if
the motion were made promptly after the jury was dismissed, the mover would
have an unconditional right to have the motion heard, but that if this were not
done, a court could exercise discretion to hear the motion within ten days.17
The court of appeals' opinion makes no mention of the sources that the
supreme court relied on in Boone. Rather, the court of appeals invoked the
general premise that "rules of civil procedure are to be construed to secure
'the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action'."18 The
court also reiterated with approval the trial judge's statement that "procedural
difficulties sometimes do not result in justice."19 Despite an apparent desire
to harmonize its interpretation of Rule 59(b) with the more general dictates of
Rule 1, the court of appeals was also careful to warn that "counsel should be
careful to comply with Rule 59(b) and not interpret this opinion as an open
invitation to ignore its dictates. "'
The supreme court's decision in Boone is consistent with the history of
Rule 59. The present South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure are based
largely on the Federal Rules, but it was sometimes necessary for the drafters
of the South Carolina rules to tailor the Federal Rules to state practice. The
South Carolina drafters specifically rejected federal Rule 59(b), which allowed
post-trial motions to be made not later than ten days after entry of judge-
ment.21 Former South Carolina practice was also rejected as ambiguous and
ten days after entry of judgment. S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
14. S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(b) note.
15. 307 S.C. 523, 415 S.E.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1992), overruled by Boone v. Goodwin, __
S.C. __, 444 S.E.2d 524 (1994).
16. Id. at 527, 415 S.E.2d at 847 (citing 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 475 (1989)).
17. Id. (stating that the court would consider the timing and reasons for delay in determining
whether a motion for a new trial should be granted).
18. Id. (quoting S.C. R. Civ. P. 1).
19. Id. The court of appeals' more liberal interpretation of Rule 59(b) may have been
motivated to some extent by the specific facts and circumstances before the court. Unlike the
situation in Boone, the party receiving the adverse judgment in Buxton moved for a new trial only
hours later on the same day. Id. at 525, 415 S.E.2d at 846.
20. Buxton, 307 S.C. at 527, 415 S.E.2d at 847.
21. LIGHTSEY & FLANAGAN, supra note 13, at 392. The drafters apparently viewed the
federal model as unsuitable because of the nature of judicial rotation and the fact that many post-
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"a trap for the unwary. "I It is therefore clear that the new rule was
intended to duplicate neither the federal rule nor former South Carolina
practice. By requiring a party to "make a motion for a new trial promptly
after the jury is discharged or request ten days within which to make the
motion,"' the South Carolina Supreme Court has provided a definitive
interpretation of Rule 59(b) and clarified an important area of state civil
procedure.
L. Gregory C. Horton
IV. COURT REVIVES COMMON-LAW BILL OF DISCOVERY
In Wofford v. Ethyl Corporationt the South Carolina Supreme Court
addressed the issue of discovery from nonparties and revived the common-law
bill of discovery.2 The court determined that apart from the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, courts maintain equitable jurisdiction to entertain
independent suits of discovery when the rules do not provide an adequate
mechanism.3 Noting that South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 34(c)
authorizes independent discovery against a nonparty, the court held that a bill
of discovery may be granted despite the absence of a present lawsuit to which
the requested discovery is relevant.4
In Wofford an employee of Ethyl Corporation (Ethyl) suffered a fatal
injury while working at Ethyl's plant. After Ethyl paid the required workers'
compensation benefits, the administrator of the decedent's estate, Wofford,
sought permission from Ethyl to inspect its plant to determine whether a claim
existed against a third party.' Ethyl refused the request and Wofford filed an
action to compel the employer to allow the inspection. The trial court granted
Wofford's request for discovery and Ethyl appealed.6
trial motions could be raised and resolved shortly after the verdict. Id.
22. Id. at 391-92. Former Circuit Court Rule 79 and S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-33-110 and 15-
33-120 (Law Co-op. 1976) required counsel to make motions for JNOV and for a new trial after
the reception of the verdict and before the trial court's adjournment.
23. Boone, __ S.C. at __, 444 S.E.2d at 525.
1. __ S.C. _, 447 S.E.2d 187 (1994).
2. Id. at _447 S.E.2d at 189.
3. Id. at _447 S.E.2d at 189.
4. Id. at _447 S.E.2d at 189.
5. Id. at__, 447 S.E.2d at 188. Due to the exclusive remedy provisions of the South
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, Ethyl could not be a defendant in future litigation. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
6. Wofford, __ S.C. at __, 447 S.E.2d at 188.
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Ethyl asserted that because Rule 34 does not specifically authorize a
prelawsuit discovery action against a nonparty, the requested inspection could
not be granted.7 The court disagreed, noting that subdivision (c) expressly
provides that the rule does not foreclose an independent action for discovery
against a nonparty. 8
South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 34 was patterned after its federal
counterpart, which prior to 1970 did not contain subdivision (c).9 Before the
1970 addition of subdivision (c), several courts refused to entertain indepen-
dent actions for discovery against nonparties, believing the Rules to be
preemptive.' ° In fact, prior to this addition the federal rules contained a
"curious gap"" affecting discovery from nonparties. For example, Federal
Rule 34(a) provided for the production of items and entry upon land for
inspection, but by its express terms applied only to parties.12 A Rule 45
subpoena allowed the inspection of some nonparty items, but only those items
which the nonparty could transport to the deposition.13 If the item to be
inspected was too large and remained on the nonparty premises, as in Wofford,
no rule authorized entry onto the land, and a party seeking discovery could not
obtain it due to this gap in the discovery rules.
14
7. Id. at , 447 S.E.2d at 188.
8. Id. at__, 447 S.E.2d at 189. Rule 34(c) states, "This rule does not preclude an
independent action against a person not a party for production of documents and things and
permission to enter upon land." S.C. R. CIV. P. 34(c).
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c) (amended 1991).
10. See 8 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2209 (1994); Note, Rule 34(c) and Discovery of Nonparty Land, 85 YALE L.J. 112, 114
(1975). The federal rules advisory committee noted:
Comments from the bar make clear that in the preparation of cases for trial it is
occasionally necessary to enter land or inspect large tangible things in the possession
of a person not a party, and that some courts have dismissed independent actions in
the nature of bills in equity for such discovery on the ground that Rule 34 is
preemptive.
FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note.
11. Note, supra note 10, at 112.
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34; S.C. R. Civ. P. 34.
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) (amended 1991); S.C. R. Civ. P. 45 (amended 1993). In
1991 and in 1993, both the federal rules and the South Carolina rules were amended to allow a
subpoena permitting the inspection of the premises of a nonparty. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C);
S.C. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). South Carolina Rule 34(c) was also amended to reflect this change
and now reads:
A person not a party may be compelled to produce documents or things or submit to
an inspection only as provided in Rule 45. This rule does not preclude an independent
action against a person not a party for production of documents and things and
permission to enter upon land.
S.C. R. Civ. P. 34(c).
14. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 2209 (1994); Note, supra note 10, at 112.
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Although the 1970 amendment to Rule 34 at issue in Wofford did not
expressly authorize entry onto land of a nonparty, it clearly provided that the
rules of civil procedure are not preemptive and do not foreclose the possibility
of an independent action for discovery.15 Accordingly, the exclusion of any
express authorization for inspection of the property of nonparties does not
foreclose such an action.16
Whether and under what circumstances an independent action may be
brought depends upon each jurisdiction's treatment of the equitable bill of
discovery. Relying on Shorey v. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. 7 and Ex parte
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,18 the South Carolina Supreme Court
determined that modem discovery rules have not destroyed the court's
traditional equitable jurisdiction in South Carolina. 9 While the existence of
modem rules has nearly eliminated the need for an independent action, courts
may still use their equitable power to grant a bill of discovery "when effective
discovery cannot otherwise be obtained and the ends of justice served." 20 In
this case, Wofford's only alternative was to seek an equitable bill of discovery
because no other discovery procedure would authorize entry onto a nonparty's
land. Without the requested discovery, Wofford could not determine whether
a claim against another party existed. The court thus upheld the trial judge's
grant of the desired discovery.2'
The court further held that a trial court may grant a bill of discovery even
though no civil action yet exists.' At common law the bill was most often
used to aid a party in an action already pending, but the court ruled that the
pendency of such action was not necessary.Y Because discovery may be
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note (explaining that jurisdictional and
procedural problems prevented the direct authorization by Rule 34 of discovery against
nonparties); see also Wimes v. Eaton Corp., 573 F. Supp. 331, 334-37 (E.D. Wisc. 1983);
Huynh v. Werke, 90 F.R.D. 447,450 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (explaining that "while Rule 34(c) does
not explicitly authorize independent discovery actions against nonparties, neither does it prohibit
them"); Folsom v. Western Elec. Co., 85 F.R.D. 651, 652-53 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (pointing out
that Rule 34(c) does not preclude an independent action against a nonparty).
16. See HARRY M. LIGHTSEY & JAMES F. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE
326 (1985). "Rule 34(c) was added to make clear that the Rule was not the exclusive means of
compelling the production and inspection of documents and entry onto land. It [the rule] does not
specify any of the procedures to be used in the special proceedings which are left to prior case
law." Id.
17. 511 A.2d 1076, 1078 (Me. 1986).
18. 248 S.C. 412, 150 S.E.2d 525 (1966).
19. Wofford, _ S.C. at __, 447 S.E.2d at 189.
20. Id. at _, 447 S.E.2d at 189 (citing Shorey, 511 A.2d at 1078).
21. Id. at __, 447 S.E.2d at 189.
22. Id. at _, 447 S.E.2d at 189.
23. Id. at _, 447 S.E.2d at 189 (citing Shorey, 511 A.2d at 1078).
[Vol. 47
21
et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1995
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
necessary to determine the appropriate parties, proof of the existence of a valid
claim and proof that a suit is about to commence is sufficient.2
The court's ruling in Wofford that statutes and modem discovery rules
have not displaced the equitable jurisdiction of the court to entertain indepen-
dent suits of discovery has much support in other jurisdictions." However,
some have argued that the modem policy of creating simpler, more uniform,
and more efficient procedures calls for a disposal of the cumbersome bill.'
Finding this argument persuasive, some jurisdictions have rendered the bill
obsolete.27
The court relied upon Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.2" in
concluding that courts may grant a bill in equity when the rules do not provide
adequate relief.29 In that case, defendant Goodyear sought to examine an
allegedly defective tire that was the subject of litigation and in the possession
of an adversary.3" The discovery statutes then in existence did not allow such
discovery. Nevertheless, the court determined that the trial court had the
inherent equitable authority to order discovery beyond that which was then
authorized by statute. 31 Because, however, the issue before the court in
Goodyear was limited to allowing discovery against an adverse party in a
pending action at law,32 Ethyl argued, unsuccessfully, that Goodyear should
not be controlling.33
The traditional bill in equity was ordinarily used by parties in a pending
action at law. Without the bill, the adversary could not be compelled to
relinquish items that could be used by the opponent.34 In fact, some authority
24. Wofford, _ S.C. at , 447 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting JOHN N. POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 197(b) (1941)).
25. See, e.g., Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1994) ("[Tihe bill [of discovery]
is within the inherent power of a court of equity... [and] has been a procedural tool in use for
centuries. The bill is well recognized and may be entertained notwithstanding the statutes and
rules of court relative to discovery.") (citations omitted); Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.
v. Hegwood, 569 So. 2d 1295, 1296-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (en bane) ("Statutes designed
to supersede or modify rights provided by common law must be strictly construed and will not
displace common law remedies unless such an intent is expressly declared.") (citations omitted).
26. E.g., Wimes v. Eaton Corp., 573 F. Supp. 331, 336 (E.D. Wisc. 1983); Home Ins. Co.
v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome, 89 F.R.D. 485, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Note, supra note 10,
at 119.
27. See Rothery Storage and Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 554, 556 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (mem.); Guertin v. Guertin, 561 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990). In Guertin
the Illinois Court Rules specifically provide for the type of discovery desired in Wofford even
though the court ruled that the equitable bill was obsolete in Illinois. See id., 561 N.E.2d at 1342.
28. 248 S.C. 412, 150 S.E.2d 525 (1966).
29. Wofford, _ S.C. at _, 447 S.E.2d at 189.
30. Exparte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 248 S.C. at 415, 150 S.E.2d at 526.
31. Id. at 421, 150 S.E.2d at 529.
32. Id. at 417-21, 150 S.E.2d at 527-29.
33. Amended Final Brief of Appellant at 8-10.
34. See Shutes v. Fowler, 584 N.E.2d 920, 922 (I11. App. Ct. 1991); Shorey v. Lincoln Pulp
1995]
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suggests that the bill was never intended to apply to those who are not parties
to a lawsuit.3" When, however, the traditional bill did not provide the desired
discovery, courts began to broaden its application to fit the needs of parties
seeking discovery.36 A large number of courts have extended the bill to
provide for discovery from nonparties.37 Similarly, many courts have
eliminated the requirement of a pending lawsuit.3"
Consistent with the nature of equity jurisprudence, the Wofford court did
not specify under what circumstances a bill should be granted and the extent
of the discovery, except that the trial judge should issue "appropriate
orders . . . when effective discovery cannot otherwise be obtained and the
ends of justice served." 39 In most instances, whether and to what extent
discovery is allowed is left to the discretion of the trial judge, who is in the
best position to determine the necessity of the information in relation to the
burden on the defendant.' In any case, the bill should not be viewed as an
open invitation to delve into the affairs of another.4"
When the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure failed to provide a
mechanism for discovery, the Wofford court granted an independent bill of
discovery, allowing inspection of the premises of a nonparty despite the lack
of a pending lawsuit to which the discovery was relevant. Even though South
Carolina's bill was previously limited to use against adverse parties while an
action at law was pending, the court's extension of the bill to fit the circum-
stances presented in Wofford was appropriate because, without such discovery,
& Paper Co., 511 A.2d 1076, 1077-78 (Me. 1986).
35. See Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 378 A.2d 53, 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977)
(citing 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1856(d) (1976)).
36. See Note, supra note 10, at 116.
37. E.g., Lubrin v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 109 F.R.D. 403, 404-05 (D.V.I. 1986);
Pottetti v. Clifford, 150 A.2d 207, 212 (Conn. 1959); Shorey v. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., 511
A.2d 1076, 1078 (Me. 1986); Robbins v. Kalwall Corp., 417 A.2d 4, 5 (N.H. 1980) (per
curiam).
38. E.g., Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. v. Hegwood, 569 So. 2d 1295, 1297 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (en banc); Temple v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 840 P.2d 561, 565 (Mont.
1992).
39. Wofford, _ S.C. at _, 447 S.E.2d at 189 (citing Shorey, 511 A.2d at 1078).
40. See Snyder v. Queen Cutlery Co., 516 A.2d 71, 74 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1986) ("Mhe lower
court is in a better position to weigh the equities of the situation.. . ."). Several factors that
might be considered in making those determinations include: (1) the interest of the proposed
deponent from whom discovery is sought in the outcome of the litigation; (2) the necessity or
importance of the information sought; (3) the ease of supplying the information; (4) the
significance of the rights or interest the nonparty seeks to protect; and (5) whether a less
burdensome means to accomplish the objective exists. See Berrie v. Berrie, 457 A.2d 76, 81
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983).
41. See Rothery Storage and Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 554, 556 (N.D.
II1. 1985) (mem.); Temple v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 840 P.2d 561, 566 (Mont. 1992).
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the plaintiff would have been precluded from ascertaining whether a claim
existed.
Nancy Johnson Mullis
V. COURT HOLDS THAT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Is NOT A JURISDICTIONAL BAR
In Washington v. Whitaker' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense that a party must plead in order
to avoid its waiver.2 Specifically, the court held that a municipality waived
its objection to the propriety of punitive damages assessed pursuant to an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19833 by failing to object until the
municipality made a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto (JNOV). In
so holding, the court overruled the long-standing rule that.sovereign immunity
is a jurisdictional bar that cannot be waived.
On February 16, 1989, Charleston police conducted a drug raid pursuant
to a warrant issued upon an officer's affidavit that he observed a confidential
informant enter a dwelling at 37H Flood Street on two separate occasions to
purchase cocaine from a suspect named "Dean." When police executed the
warrant, they knocked on the door to 37H Flood Street and asked for Dean.
Josephine Washington, the resident of 37H Flood Street, informed police that
Dean lived next door. Nevertheless, police entered the dwelling and, after
finding no evidence of illegal drugs on the premises, performed strip searches
on Ms. Washington, her daughter, and her granddaughter. Police found no
illegal drugs.4 The apartment residents subsequently brought a state court
action5 against the City of Charleston and the police officers in charge of the
search, alleging Fourth Amendment violations under § 1983 and the South
Carolina Tort Claims Act.6
1. __ S.C. __,451 S.E.2d 894 (1994).
2. Id. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 898.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
4. Washington, _ S.C. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 896.
5. State and federal courts enjoy concurrentjurisdiction over private causes of action brought
pursuant to § 1983. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99-101 (1980) (citing Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
6. Washington, _ S.C. at __, 451 S.E.2d at 897; see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to
19951
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At trial, the City made a motion to strike punitive damages from the
complaint on the § 1983 action because of insufficient evidence. The motion
was denied. The City then submitted its proposed punitive damages charge.7
After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding both actual and
punitive damages under § 1983, s the City moved for a JNOV based upon the
United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc.9 The trial judge ruled that the City waived its right to object to the
propriety of punitive damages by submitting its own suggested punitive
damages charge and by failing to object to the charge or verdict form pursuant
to Rule 51 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.' ° The City
appealed, assigning as error the trial judge's failure to strike the punitive
damages from the § 1983 action pursuant to City of Newport.I'
The court held that the City waived any possible objection to punitive
damages on procedural grounds. Although the court apparently recognized
City of Newport as controlling, it nevertheless determined that the plain
meaning of Rule 51 precluded the City from raising the issue on appeal.' 2
Unlike federal courts, South Carolina courts do not recognize a plain error
rule exception to Rule 51, which would have given the court grounds to hear
the issue on appeal. 3 Instead, in South Carolina courts, "a contemporaneous
-190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
7. Washington, _ S.C. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 898.
8. If a search is determined to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, punitive
damages are proper. See Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
9. 453 U.S. 247 (1981). In City of Newport the Court held that a municipality cannot be held
liable for punitive damages under § 1983. Id. at 271.
10. Rule 51 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court rea-
sonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in the requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed
action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shall in-
struct the jury after the arguments are completed. No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds for his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of
the hearing of the jury.
S.C. R. Clv. P. 51 (emphasis added).
11. Washington, _ S.C. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 898. The court considered a number of other
issues on appeal. Specifically, the defendant police officer maintained that he was entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity. Both parties argued that they were entitled to a directed verdict
on the § 1983 action, that a juror should have been disqualified, that evidence concerning drug
activity in the neighborhood should have been admissible, that both parties were entitled to a
mistrial, that a magistrate had been improperly questioned, and that their request to charge the
jury that a search performed pursuant to a valid warrant is presumed to be valid and reasonable
was improperly refused. Id. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 897.
12. Id. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 898.
13. The plain error rule provides that errors which affect substantial rights may be considered
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objection must be made to preserve an argument for appellate review."14 In
so holding, the court expressly overruled "the antiquated rule that sovereign
immunity is a jurisdictional bar and, accordingly, cannot be waived. "15
Now, under South Carolina law, sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense
that a party must plead in order to prevent waiver.
16
On its face, Rule 51 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure seems
to deal effectively with the waiver issue that was before the court. Because
the City failed to make an objection to the jury charge until after a verdict was
returned, any subsequent objection would be procedurally barred. In order to
reach that result, the court merely needed to determine that sovereign
immunity was a defense capable of being waived. The court accomplished this
by simply stating that sovereign immunity was no longer a jurisdictional
bar. 17
Justice Littlejohn dissented, noting that the majority's ruling created the
anomalous result of allowing the plaintiffs to recover punitive damages against
the City when "the General Assembly has said that such are not recoverable
under [the] South Carolina Tort Claims Act and the United States Supreme
Court has said that punitive damages are not recoverable under a 1983
claim."" s In McCall v. BatsonP9 the South Carolina Supreme Court abol-
ished sovereign immunity for all cases filed after July, 1, 1986.10 The
on appeal, even if not raised at trial, where manifest injustice would result. City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256 (1981).
14. Washington, _ S.C. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 898 (citing Taylor v. Bridgebuilders, Inc.,
275 S.C. 236, 269 S.E.2d 337 (1980)).
15. Id. at -, 451 S.E.2d at 898. Previously, sovereign immunity was considered a question
of subject matter jurisdiction that could be raised at any time up to, and including, appeal. See
Lowry v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 25 S.C. 416, 420, 1 S.E. 141, 144 (1886);
Hammarskold v. Bull, 43 S.C.L. (9 Rich.) 474, 482-83 (1856) (stating that a "[p]rivilege may
be waived by neglect to plead it in due time; but an objection to the jurisdiction ... is at all
times fatal").
16. Washington, - S.C. at _ & n.7, 451 S.E.2d at 898 & n.7 (citing, inter alia, Gavin
v. City of New Haven, 445 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1982); Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago, 492 N.E.2d
1292 (II. 1986); and Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1988)). Other
jurisdictions that have considered the issue in the same procedural posture have held that
sovereign immunity, because it is a jurisdictional bar, cannot be waived by a failure to assert it
as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Ramsey v. City of Forest Park, 418 S.E.2d 432, 433 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1992); City of Lavergne v. Southern Silver, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1993); see also 18 EUGENE MCQUILLEN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION §
53.02.30 (1993) (cataloguing the jurisdictions which hold that any waiver of sovereign immunity
must be express).
17. Washington, _ S.C. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 898.
18. Id. at _, 451 S.E.2d at 903-04 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
19. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
20. Id. at 246, 329 S.E.2d at 743. The McCall court expressly preserved immunity for all
legislative,judicial, and executive officers vested with discretionary authority when acting in their
1995]
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General Assembly responded by passing the South Carolina Tort Claims Act,
which provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity while retaining the
defense for discretionary acts of government officials.2 Moreover, the
General Assembly expressly excluded liability for punitive damages from its
limited waiver of sovereign immunity.'
Recent South Carolina case law has reinforced this principle. In
Macmurphy v. South Carolina Department of Highways & Public Transpor-
tation the supreme court recognized that although McCall abolished
sovereign immunity, it did not address the issue of punitive damages. The
court concluded that McCall did not affect the rule that sovereign immunity
precluded the recovery of punitive damages against a municipality.24
In City of Newport, a case which is factually similar to Washington, the
United States Supreme Court held that a municipality cannot be assessed
punitive damages under § 1983. Actual and punitive damages under § 1983
were awarded against a municipality for its violations of a concert promoter's
constitutional rights to free expression and due process in connection with the
municipality's refusal to issue concert permits. The City failed to challenge
the imposition of punitive damages until it made a motion for a new trial. The
trial court noted that the city's objection was procedurally barred by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 51.26 Nevertheless, the trial court declined to rule
on procedural grounds due to the novel federal law question. Instead, it held
that a party can recover punitive damages against a municipality under
§ 1983.27 The First Circuit affirmed the decision on procedural grounds.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that punitive damages were not
recoverable against a municipality under § 1983.28
Justice Littlejohn also alluded to the fact that Washington can be criticized
from a policy perspective. Punitive damages have been viewed as offering
nothing by way of punishment and deterrence of future wrongdoing, but
official capacities. Id. at 247, 329 S.E.2d at 743.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
22. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
23. 295 S.C. 49, 367 S.E.2d 150 (1988) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 51, 367 S.E.2d at 151 (citing Clarke v. City of Greer, 231 S.C. 327, 98 S.E.2d 751
(1957)). The Macmurphy court expressly stated that its decision in McCall did not overrule
McKenzie v. McKenzie, 276 S.C. 461, 279 S.E.2d 609 (1981), which disallowed the recovery
of punitive damages on the grounds of sovereign immunity. McKenzie, 276 S.C. at 462, 279
S.E.2d at 609-10. The Macmurphy court added: "There being no legislation or case law
authorizing the recovery of punitive damages against the state or its agencies, we affirm the ruling
of the circuit court [barring recovery of punitive damages]." Macmurphy, 295 S.C. at 51, 367
S.E.2d at 151.
25. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
26. FED. R. CIv. P. 51. The federal rule is identical to the South Carolina version of Rule 51.
27. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 252-54.
28. Id. at 254, 271.
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instead operating merely as a penalty placed upon the taxpaying general
public:
[lit remains true that an award of punitive damages against a
municipality "punishes" only the taxpayers, who took no part in
the commission of the tort. These damages are assessed over and
above the amount necessary to compensate the injured party ....
Indeed, punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect
a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accom-
panied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of services for the
citizens footing the bill.29
In holding that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense that must be
pled to avoid its waiver, the Washington court apparently made a conscious
decision to resolve the punitive damages issue on procedural grounds.
Accordingly, the case is probably best viewed as an example of the court's
willingness to demand stricter adherence to procedure. Washington should
alert South Carolina attorneys to follow procedure to the letter and make a
contemporaneous objection at trial if they expect an error to be reviewed on
appeal. As a practical matter, however, the holding in Washington will have
little effect in most tort suits against a municipality because South Carolina
courts will continue to recognize that punitive damages cannot be assessed
against a municipality based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity so long
as the issue is properly preserved for appeal by the careful practitioner.
Michael S. Pitts
29. Id. at 267.
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